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Oligopoly models are usually analyzed in the context of two ﬁrms anticipating
that market outcomes would be qualitatively similar in the case of three or more
ﬁrms. This is not an exception in the literature on Hotelling’s location-then-price
competition. In this paper, we show that the main ﬁndings in Hotelling’s duopoly,
brand bunching and the max-min principle of product diﬀerentiation no longer hold
once three or more ﬁrms are allowed to enter the market. That is, oligopolists with
three or more ﬁrms proliferate brands and neither maximize nor minimize product
diﬀerentiation.
1 Introduction
Literature on the oligopoly theory is often conﬁned to two ﬁrms for the sake of analytical
convenience in the literature and with the expectation that the number of ﬁrms would
not qualitatively aﬀect oligopolistic markets much. However, in Hotelling’s (1929) spatial
competition, the diﬀerence in the equilibrium location between duopolies and oligopolies
with three or more ﬁrms is commonly known. Hence, with regard to Hotelling’s linear
market, if two ﬁrms compete ﬁrst in terms of location and then price, they will be located
as far as possible; this is interpreted as maximum diﬀerentiation in characteristic space.
On the other hand, Neven (1987) and Brenner (2005) demonstrate that if there are more
than two ﬁrms in the market, they do not maximize diﬀerentiation. Therefore, some of
∗I wish to thank Fu-Chuan Lai and Jacques Thisse for useful comments and suggestions.
†Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan. E-mail: ttabuchi@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
1the established results on Hotelling’s duopoly no longer hold when more than two ﬁrms
a r ea l l o w e dt oe n t e rt h em a r k e t .
This paper aims to settle the two important debates in industrial organization–brand
proliferation and the max-min principle of product diﬀerentiation–by considering an
oligopoly with more than two ﬁrms. First, we tackle the established ﬁndings of Martinez-
Giralt and Neven (1988) that duopolists do not open multiple outlets even if there are
no ﬁxed costs. The incentives to proliferate brands has long been attracting attention in
the ﬁeld of industrial organization. Schmalensee (1978) argued that incumbent ﬁrms may
deter new entry by brand proliferation, whereas Judd (1985) showed that an incumbent
ﬁrm withdraw some brands in order to avoid intense competition. It is true that Judd’s
(1985) framework is general enough, but his conclusions are conﬁned to duopoly. There
is no guarantee that his conclusions hold for an oligopoly with more than two ﬁrms.
Second, we address the established ﬁndings of Tabuchi (1994), Ansari, Economides
and Steckel (1997), and Irmen and Thisse (1998) that Hotelling was “almost right” be-
cause minimum diﬀerentiation (spatial concentration in a geographical space) can arise
in equilibrium along all but one dimension. The question whether product diﬀerentiation
is minimal or maximal has also been tackled in the ﬁeld of industrial organization. We
show that the diﬀerentiation is neither minimum nor maximum in the two-dimensional
space once we extend the setting from two to three or more ﬁrms.
This paper deals with multi-outlet oligopoly in the context of location-then-price com-
petition. Multi-outlet oligopoly can also be analyzed on the basis of diﬀerent frameworks.
First, it can be examined under location-then-quantity competition a la Cournot. How-
ever, we do not adopt this approach because equilibrium conﬁgurations do not necessarily
ﬁt the reality. Price competition in this paper yields segmented conﬁgurations, whereas
the same does not hold for quantity competition according to Pal and Sarkar (2002).
Under quantity competition, each ﬁrm opens outlets the way a monopolist would.
Second, rich equilibrium conﬁgurations might be obtained by assuming an elastic
demand for the good. However, works such as Economides (1984) indicates that obtaining
analytically meaningful results with elastic demand is too diﬃcult. For example, despite
the identical assumptions of the model with elastic demand, Wang and Yang (1999) and
Rath and Zhao (2001) arrive at diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations when the reservation
p r i c ei sl o w .
2Third, rich equilibrium conﬁgurations may also emerge by employing random utilities
such as logit models in the consumers’ choice of a ﬁrm. However, obtaining analytically
meaningful and interesting results seems impossible when considering multiple outlets
of more than two ﬁrms. We, therefore, focus on the traditional approach of Hotelling’s
location-then-price competition due to its mathematically tractability and because it pro-
vides a more accurate description of reality.
The general setting of Hotelling’s location-then-price competition model is explained in
the next section. We examine two kinds of consumer distributions. Section 3 considers the
simplest one, where consumers are uniformly distributed over a circumference of a circle,
and section 4 considers a more realistic but complicated distribution where consumers
are uniformly distributed over a disk. We investigate both duopoly and triopoly with
multiple outlets in these two sections. We then conduct a brief empirical analysis in
section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2G e n e r a l S e t t i n g
Consumers are uniformly distributed over a convex set in R or R2, which is a circumference
of a circle or a disk. Each consumer purchases one unit of an identical good. There are
n ﬁrms with 2 outlets at the most, which are located on the convex set. We ignore the
cost of establishing outlets for analytical simplicity.1 They produce a good without cost
and sell it at the mill price. Consumers bear the transport cost for shopping, which is
quadratic in distance x as given by tx2.
The game in this paper is as follows. Each ﬁrm simultaneously determines the number
and location of outlets in the ﬁrst stage, and then they simultaneously select each mill
price in the second stage. We know from Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) that there always
exists a unique Nash price equilibrium in the second-stage price subgame under this
setting, whereas there may be multiple equilibria in the ﬁrst-stage location subgame. In
this paper, we seek a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
1Firms may establish more than two outlets when the additional costs of outlets are low. This may
be likely in the case of a characteristic space such as the colors of clothes. We restrict our analysis to
the case of two outlets because the overall results do not qualitatively diﬀer much even if the ﬁrms are
allowed to produce many varieties (i.e., establish many outlets).
3Before examining the SPNE, deﬁne a Nash equilibrium in each stage. Because the
maximum number of outlets is two, each ﬁrm has two strategies in each stage.
Nash price equilibrium in the second stage is a price system where no ﬁrm wants to















∀i =1 ,...,n (1)
where pi ≡ (pi1,p i2) is the price vector of ﬁrm i, p−i is the set of all price vectors except
i,a n dpi1 and pi2 are the prices of ﬁrm i’s outlets 1 and 2.
The Nash location equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage is a conﬁguration where no ﬁrm wants















∀xi1 and i =1 ,...,n (2)
where xi ≡ (xi1,x i2) is the location vector of ﬁrm i, x−i is the set of all location vectors
except i,a n dxi1 and xi2 are the locations of ﬁrm i’s outlets 1 and 2. The number of
outlets of ﬁrm i is one if xi1 = xi2,a n dt w oi fxi1 6= xi2.
3 Consumer distribution over a circumference of a
circle
In this section, consumers are uniformly distributed over the circumference of a circle
with a unit length, and in the next section, they are uniformly distributed over a disk.
3.1 Duopoly
We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case of two ﬁrms. Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988)
show that ﬁrms do not open multiple outlets in a duopoly and, further, that both ﬁrms
establish one outlet at opposite ends of a diameter of a circle, which is unique up to
rotation.2
Firms locate as far as possible from each other and do not open multiple outlets in
order to mitigate the intense price competition. This implies that relaxing product dif-
ferentiation is maximized in the characteristic space in the case of duopoly. In other
2If consumers are uniformly distributed over a line segment, then ﬁrms locate at the opposite ends of
the line segment (Neven, 1985).
4words, under duopolistic location-then-price competition, price competition takes prece-
dence over increasing the market reach.
3.2 Triopoly
There are three ﬁrms rather than two ﬁrms in the market. They can establish one or two
outlets on the circumference of a circle. The location space is denoted by x ∈ [0,1).
If only one outlet is allowed in the case of triopoly, there exists a unique SPNE up
to rotation given by (xa,x b,x c)=( 1 /3,2/3,3/3).3 This is because the best locational
reply of each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage is shown to be a midpoint of the neighboring ﬁrms.
Therefore, in the case of a single outlet, the principle of maximum diﬀerentiation holds
both in a duopoly and triopoly.
However, in contrast to the case of a duopoly, we can show that ﬁrms have an incentive
to open multiple outlets in the case of a triopoly. In order to see this, consider that ﬁrm
a opens the second outlet. Then, we can easily show that establishing the second outlet
at xa2 ∈ (1/3 − 0.041,1/3+0 .041) raises a’s proﬁt. Insofar as a ﬁrm has an incentive
to open multiple outlets, the single outlet triopoly (xa,x b,x c)=( 1 /3,2/3,3/3) is not an
SPNE.
It can be veriﬁed that there are ﬁve equilibrium candidates for spatial arrangements
up to rotation ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






Each spatial arrangement seems to yield the unique location of two outlets of each ﬁrm,
obtained by using the damped Newton’s method in Mathematica calculations with several
initial values of locations. However, it can be shown that the last two arrangements are
not Nash equilibria. quasi-interlacing is unstable because withdrawing one outlet of ﬁrm
a raises its proﬁt. Quasi-partial segmentation is unstable because relocating an outlet of




in the case of a unit line segment.
5ﬁrm a to location, say, (c1 + b2)/2 raises its proﬁt. The remaining ﬁrst three candidates
are shown to be SPNE from the Appendix. Hence, we establish the following.


















i = t/108 for i =
a,b,c.
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(2 − 3r)t/54 for i = a,b,c,w h e r er =( 1 1−
√
73)/18 ' 0.136.
The proof of Proposition 1 is contained in the Appendix. This proposition shows mul-
tiple equilibria in the ﬁrst-stage location subgame, whereas there is a unique equilibrium
in the second-stage price subgame. The interlacing conﬁguration is socially optimum and
the distances are maximized. However, this is not true for the other two conﬁgurations:
ﬁrms neither maximize nor minimize product diﬀerentiation in characteristic competition.
Presume that the fourth ﬁrm enters and opens one outlet when the multi-outlet in-
cumbents are located as in Proposition 1. Then, this proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm would locate
its outlet at x =1 /12, 1/6+r/2 and 3/32 in cases (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively. It can
be shown that the proﬁt of the entrant is the smallest (0.0014t) in case (i) of interlacing
conﬁguration and largest (0.0031t) in case (iii) of the segmentation. This is parallel to
the proﬁts of the incumbents, which are the smallest (0.0093t) in the interlacing case and
largest (0.0295t) in the segmentation case. We may therefore state that keen competition
reduces the proﬁts of incumbents but prevents the entry of new ﬁrms.
If there exists a ﬁxed cost for entry, which is slightly larger than 0.0014t,t h e nb o t h
the segmentation and the partial segmentation are vulnerable to the entry of the fourth
ﬁrm, whereas the interlacing is not. In other words, the interlacing conﬁguration with
keener competition is more likely to appear than the others.
The results of Proposition 1 may be extended to a larger number of outlets. If each ﬁrm
is allowed to open a maximum of three outlets, then we can verify that both interlacing
4In the case of a line segment, we numerically conﬁrm that interlacing (a1b1c1a2b2c2) and partial





















4 Consumer distribution over a disk
4.1 Duopoly
Geographical space is two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional, and the characteristic
space is also multi-dimensional in reality. Therefore, it is of interest to consider a unit
disk {(x,y):x2 + y2 ≤ 1} over which consumers are uniformly distributed keeping the
other assumptions the same as those in the benchmark case.
Tabuchi (1994) shows that in the SPNE, two ﬁrms with one outlet each locate at




b)=( 1 ,0) up
to rotation. This implies that ﬁrms maximize diﬀerentiation in one dimension (x axis),
whereas they minimize diﬀerentiation in another dimension (y axis). This is the so-called
max-min principle of product diﬀerentiation: ﬁrms maximize diﬀerentiation only in one
dimension (x axis) while minimize diﬀerentiation in all other dimensions. This is also
shown to hold for three dimensions by Ansari, Economides, and Steckel (1997) and for an
arbitrary number of dimensions by Irmen and Thisse (1998).
4.2 Triopoly
What if there are three ﬁrms with one outlet each on the disk in section 4.1? Because
the two-dimensional analysis with more than two ﬁrms is mathematically complicated,
we seek a symmetric equilibrium. For this purpose, assume that the locations of ﬁrms a,
b and c are restricted to





where zi ∈ [0,1] for i = a,b,c as depicted in Figure 1. Let pi be the mill price of a good
by ﬁrm i. Then, there are three market boundary lines
pa +( x − xa)
2 +( y − ya)
2 = pb +( x − xb)
2 +( y − yb)
2 (4)
pb +( x − xb)
2 +( y − yb)
2 = pc +( x − xc)
2 +( y − yc)
2 (5)
pc +( x − xc)
2 +( y − yc)
2 = pa +( x − xa)
2 +( y − ya)
2 (6)
7with a common intersection point (x0,y 0) given by simultaneously solving two of the
above three equations. Let (x1,y 1) be the upper intersection point between (4) and
the circumference of the unit circle, (x2,y 2) is the lower intersection point between (5)
and the circumference, and (x3,y 3) is the upper intersection point between (6) and the
circumference. Then, ﬁrm a’s demand Da is determined by the area of the circular sector
with vertices (x0,y 0), (x1,y 1),a n d(x3,y 3); ﬁrm b’s demand Db by that with (x0,y 0),
(x1,y 1),a n d(x2,y 2);a n dﬁrm c’s demand Dc by that with (x0,y 0), (x2,y 2),a n d(x3,y 3).
Hence, the proﬁto fﬁrm i = a,b,c is given by
Πi(pa,p b,p c,z a,z b,z c)=piDi
Each ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt with respect to its price pi. Unlike the one-dimensional
case, one cannot obtain a closed form solution of pi from the ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂Πi
∂pi
=0 for i = a,b,c (7)
However, we know from Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) that there always exists a unique Nash
price equilibrium p∗
i in the second-stage price subgame because the demand is convex.
In the ﬁrst-stage location subgame, ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt with respect to zi given
the unique equilibrium prices p∗























=0 for i = a,b,c (8)
where the second equality is due to (7). The partial derivatives ∂pj/∂zi can be obtained


















































where fi ≡ ∂Πi/∂pi is deﬁned by (7).
The symmetric equilibrium candidate can be computed by solving (7) and (8) si-
multaneously and evaluating a symmetric solution zi = z and pi = p for i = a,b,c.






















72(432−π2) π2t ≈ 1.040t
(9)
The suﬃcient conditions for Nash location equilibrium can be ascertained locally by check-
ing the second-order conditions at zi = z∗
i and pi = p∗
i. However, one can check the
suﬃcient conditions globally by numerical analysis in the following two steps. First, cal-
culate pa and pb(= pc) by numerically solving ∂Πa/∂pa =0and ∂Πb/∂pb =0in (7) for
za =0 ,0.01,0.02,...,1 given the values of zb = zc = z∗
i. Note that the unique price equi-
librium is always guaranteed. Second, by plugging the equilibrium prices into Πa,w ec a n
express Πa as a function of za a sd r a w ni nF i g u r e2 .B e c a u s et h ep r o ﬁt Πa is obviously
single-peaked at za = z∗
i,o n ec a nc o n ﬁrm that (9) is the unique SPNE under the location
constraints (3).
Before interpreting the SPNE outcome, we should determine whether there are any
other equilibria without the location constraints (3). One possible candidate for SPNE is
axisymmetric location:
(xa,y a)=( −b z,0), (xb,y b)=( 0 ,0), (xc,y c)=( b z,0)
In order to verify this, assume that the locations of the three ﬁrms are restricted to the
x-axis, such that
(xa,y a)=( za,0), (xb,y b)=( zb,0), (xc,y c)=( zc,0)
where −1 ≤ za ≤ zb ≤ zc ≤ 1. The market boundaries are given by lines parallel to the
y-axis. Conducting similar computations with axisymmetric location za = −zc = −b z,w e
have a unique candidate for SPNE:
(b za,b zb,b zc) ≈ (−0.322,0,0.322)
(b pa, b pb, b pc) ≈ (0.319t,0.215t,0.319t)
(b Πa, b Πb, b Πc) ≈ (0.299t,0.273t,0.299t)
However, this is not a SPNE because ﬁrm b has an incentive to relocate: if it moves
from the center (xb,y b)=( 0 ,0) to the periphery (xb,y b)=( 0 ,1), then its proﬁt will
rise from 0.273t to 0.439t. The last possibilities are asymmetric conﬁgurations, which
9are unlikely to be equilibria given the uniform distribution of consumers. Hence, the
symmetric conﬁguration (9) seems to be the unique SPNE.
Several remarks are in order here. First, the equilibrium locations of the ﬁrms are
inside the disk in the case of triopoly, whereas they are on the edges in the case of
duopoly.5 This suggests that triopolists locate themselves closer in order to gain the
market area at a cost of tough price competition because location competition for market
area is more important for their proﬁts. On the other hand, duopolists locate themselves
apart in order to relax price competition, which is more important for their proﬁts than
location competition.
Second, the optimum locations of ﬁrms can be determined by minimizing the sum of




0.551 > 0.548 = z∗
i.T h a ti s ,ﬁrms tend to locate themselves close to each other relative
to the social optimum, implying that the location competition eﬀect given by the ﬁrst
term in (8) is stronger than the price competition eﬀect given by the second term in
(8), as compared to the case of duopoly. Note, however, that three ﬁrms tend to locate
themselves apart as relative to the social optimum in the linear case (xo
2−xo
1 =1 /3 < 3/8=
x∗
2−x∗
1). This implies that price competition is mitigated relative to location competition
in the two-dimensional space. Put diﬀerently, location competition is important relative to
price competition in the two-dimensional space because larger demand can be obtained
by locating closer to the center in the two-dimensional space as compared to the one-
dimensional space.
Third, because the equilibrium locations of ﬁrms are neither at the edges nor the center,
the max-min principle of product diﬀerentiation, which is true in the case of duopoly
(Tabuchi, 1994; Ansari, Economides and Steckel, 1997; Irmen and Thisse, 1998), no longer
h o l d sa ta l li nt h ec a s eo ft r i o p o l y .T h em a x - m i np r i n c i p l eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation itself
is impossible for more than two ﬁrms and is nothing but an artifact for duopoly. Therefore,
o n em a yc o n c l u d et h a tc o n t r a r yt ot h ec a s eo fd u o p o l y ,Hotelling was not almost right
5Such diﬀerent outcomes do not arise in the previous section because the space on the circumference
of a circle is homogeneous. On the other hand, the space on a disk or a linear segment is heterogeneous
because access to consumers diﬀer between the center and peripheries. In other words, a closer location
between three or more ﬁrms arises owing to the existence of centrality. Note that for the emergence of
multiple outlets, three or more ﬁrms are needed, but centrality is not necessary, as we saw in section 3.2.
10once there are three ﬁrms in the market.
Fourth, the qualitatively similar outcome can also be numerically conﬁrmed in the












for i = a,b,c,d.6 O b s e r v et h a t( i )t h eﬁrms’ locations are inside the disk: z∗
i < 1, (ii)
ﬁrms tend to locate close as compared to the social optimum: zo
i =4
√
2/3π ≈ 0.600 >
0.478 ≈ z∗
i, and (iii) the max-min principle of product diﬀerentiation does not hold.
Finally, consider whether triopolists on a disk have an incentive to open multiple














and split the outlet of ﬁrm a horizontally as
(xa1,y a1)=( −e,z
∗




i ≈ 0.548 is given by (9).














which implies that ﬁrm a has an incentive to split its outlet into two. Due to the locational
symmetry, each ﬁrm has an incentive to establish multiple outlets.
5A v e r a g e d i s t a n c e
Figure 3 illustrates the locations of convenience stores for 2009 inside the red circle with
radius one kilometer around Shinjuku station in Tokyo. There are ﬁve ﬁrms–Seven-
Eleven, Lawson, FamilyMart, am/pm, and CircleKSunkus–with 14, 13, 12, 19, and 15
6There is another location equilibrium candidate: ﬁrms a, b,a n dc locate symmetrically about the
center, and ﬁrm d locates at the center; distances from the location of ﬁrm d and the remaining ﬁrms are
z ≈ 0.465. However, this is not an SPNE because ﬁrm d can raise its proﬁt by relocating to an edge that
is farther away from the competitors.
11stores, respectively. Similar location conﬁgurations are observed around Shibuya station
in Tokyo, Sakae station in Nagoya, and Nanba station in Osaka.
There is no doubt that convenience stores are typically multi-outlet spatial oligopolists.
Although convenience stores sell a wide variety of products, their selections of varieties
are quite similar. Therefore, goods are more or less homogeneous, which suggests that
Hotelling’s spatial competition may apply. Convenience stores compete in the number
and location of outlets. They normally sell goods at regular prices. However, they often
compete in price in terms of, for example, discounts on plastic bottles of water.
In order to see whether the locations of convenience stores are interlaced or segmented,
we compute the ratio of the average distance between outlets belonging to the same ﬁrm,
ds, to that belonging to diﬀerent ﬁrms, dd.W e r e f e r t o ds/dd a st h ed e g r e eo fm i x i n g .
By measuring the distances between convenience stores around Shinjuku, Shibuya, Sakae,
and Nanba, we obtain the degree of mixing ds/dd =0 .99, 0.98, 1.04,a n d1.03, respectively.
Whether the values close to 1 imply interlacing or segmentation can be determined
by computing the degree of mixing in each conﬁguration in Proposition 1 in section 3.2.
It can be readily shown that the degree of mixing is the largest (ds/dd =2 ) in the case
of interlacing conﬁguration because ds =1 /2 and dd =1 /4. It is an intermediate value
(ds/dd =0 .8) in the case of partial segmentation and the smallest value (ds/dd =0 .2)i n
the case of segmentation.
Because the values of the degree of mixing are intermediate, the spatial conﬁgurations
of convenience stores around the four big stations in Japan are neither interlaced nor
segmented. They are mid-way between the two conﬁgurations.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We revisited Hotelling’s location-then-price competition by considering uniform distribu-
tions of consumers over a circumference of a circle and a disk in order to settle the debates
on brand proliferation and max-min principle of product diﬀerentiation.
Comparing the market outcomes between duopoly and oligopoly with three or more
ﬁrms, we have shown that ﬁrms proliferate brands in the latter but not in the former, and
that ﬁrms neither maximize nor minimize product diﬀerentiation in the latter but not in
the former. We may therefore conclude that duopoly substantially diﬀers from oligopoly
12with three or more ﬁrms.
We also conducted a brief empirical analysis in order to ﬁnd the diﬀerence between
theory and reality. Computing the degree of mixing, we have shown that the spatial
conﬁgurations of convenience stores near big stations in Japan are partially segmented.
However, much work remains to be done in order to fully settle the above two debates.
Our analysis has dismissed the sequential entry of ﬁrms. If ﬁrm entry is sequential under
perfect foresight (Prescott and Visscher, 1977) in the setting of section 3.2, then market
segmentation is an SPNE, which ensures higher proﬁts for all ﬁrms according to pre-
liminary simulations. We have also dismissed endogenizing the number of outlets, which
depends on the ﬁxed costs of entry. These market outcomes are perhaps more complicated
but, nevertheless, richer and may better ﬁt the reality.
A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Firm i = a, b,a n dc establishes outlets i1 and i2 at x = xi1,x i2. The number of outlets of
ﬁrm i is 1 if xi1 = xi2 and 2 if xi1 6= xi2. Suppose outlets of ﬁrm i are located such that
xj <x i1 <x k and xl <x i2 <x m,w h e r ej,k,l,m could be i1 or i2. Then, the full prices of
the good in the visiting outlets i and j are equal at location b xab of marginal consumers:
pi1 +(b xij − xi1)
2 = pj +( xj − b xij)
2







Marginal consumers at b xij are indiﬀerent between visiting outlets i and j.T h e o t h e r
market boundaries are similarly computed. Then, the proﬁto fﬁrm i is deﬁned as
Πi = pi1(b xik − b xij)+pi2(b xil − b xim)
Because Πi i sq u a d r a t i ca n dc o n c a v ei npi1 and pi2,t h eﬁrst-order condition is linear in
pi1 and pi2, ensuring that the unique equilibrium prices are explicitly obtained. Plugging
the equilibrium prices into the proﬁts, they can be expressed as functions of locations
xa1,x a2,x b1,x b2,x c1 and xc2.S o l v i n g t h e ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to locations
yields the necessary conditions for SPNE.
13There are ﬁve SPNE candidates up to rotation and permutation:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
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quasi-partial segmentation (xa1,x b1,x c1,x c2,x a2,x b2)=( r1,r 2,r 3,1 − r3,1 − r2,1 − r1)




2 + r4, 1
2 + r5,1
¢
where r =( 1 1−
√
73)/18 ' 0.136, r1 ' 0.120, r2 ' 0.313, r3 ' 0.462, r4 ' 0.182,a n d
r5 ' 0.318. In the following sections, the ﬁrst three candidates are shown to be SPNE,
whereas the last two are not.
A.1 Interlacing
Because this is a perfectly symmetric conﬁguration, it is obvious that the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the location competition are met. For indicating SPNE, we show that
(xa1,x a2)=( 1 /6,4/6) is the maximizer of e Πa(xa1,x a2) in the intervals of xa1 ∈ [0,2/6]
and xa2 ∈ [3/6,5/6] given (xb1,x c1,x b2,x c2)=( 2 /6,3/6,5/6,6/6).
Let e Πi be the proﬁto fﬁrm i after plugging the equilibrium prices solved in the second
stage. Because the Nash location equilibrium conditions in the ﬁrst stage are de Πi/dxi1 =







































































































a2 + 475172xa2 + 69217







a2xa1 + 1368xa2xa1 − 368xa1 − 204x2
a2 + 268xa2 − 71
¢3
14Because h(xa1,x a2) is always positive, the numerator of (1) should be zero for Nash
location equilibrium. We show g(xa1,x a2) 6=0below and conclude that 2xa2−2xa1−1=0
holds.
Because g(xa1,x a2) is the 7th order polynomial with respect to xa1, the sign of
∂6g/∂x6
a1 does not change. Because ∂6g(0,x a2)/∂x6
a1 < 0 and ∂6g(2/6,x a2)/∂x6
a1 < 0,
we have ∂6g/∂x6
a1 < 0 for all xa1 ∈ [0,2/6]. Hence, the sign of ∂3g/∂x3
a1 changes a maxi-
mum of three times. However, because ∂3g(0,x a2)/∂x3
a1 < 0 and ∂3g(2/6,x a2)/∂x3
a1 > 0,
the sign of ∂3g/∂x3
a1 changes exactly once from negative to positive. Hence, the sign of
∂g/∂xa1 changes a maximum of three times. Nevertheless, because ∂g(0,x a2)/∂xa1 > 0
and ∂g(2/6,x a2)/∂xa1 < 0, the sign of ∂g/∂xa1 changes exactly once from positive to
negative. However, because g(0,x a2) > 0 and g(2/6,x a2) > 0, g(xa1,x a2) > 0 holds for
all xa1 ∈ [0,2/6].
Therefore, (1) implies xa2 = xa1 +1 /2. Substituting this into de Πa/dxa1 =0 ,w ec a n
show that (xa1,x a2)=( 1 /6,4/6) i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o no fde Πa/dxa1 =d e Πa/dxa2 =0 .
Furthermore, we can verify the second-order conditions for local maximum. Putting
these results together, we arrive at (xa1,x a2)=( 1 /6,4/6) as the global maximizer of
Π∗
a(xa1,x a2). Finally, we can verify that withdrawing one of the two outlets decreases the
proﬁto fﬁrm a.
Moreover, because the same can be applicable for i = b,c, (xa1,x b1,x c1,x a2,x b2,x c2)=
(1/6,2/6,3/6,4/6,5/6,6/6) i st h eu n i q u ei n t e r l a c i n gc o n ﬁguration that is an SPNE up to
permutation. By plugging these values, into prices and proﬁts, we have the equilibrium
prices and proﬁt sg i v e ni nP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
A.2 Partial segmentation
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the location competition are readily conﬁrmed. Similar to
the interlacing case, we show that (xa1,x a2)=( 3 /16,5/16) is the maximizer of e Πa for
all 0 ≤ xa1 ≤ xa2 ≤ 8/16 given (xc1,x b1,x b2,x c2)=( 8 /16,11/16,13/16,16/16) and that
(xc1,x c2)=( 8 /16,16/16) is the maximizer of e Πc in the intervals of xc1 ∈ [0,3/16] and
xc2 ∈ [5/16,11/16] given (xa1,x a2,x b1,x b2)=( 3 /16,5/16,11/16,13/16)
Computing de Πa/dxa1+de Πa/dxa2 =0 , we get an expression similar to (1). Further, by
identifying the derivatives up to the 4th order, we can show that (xa1,x a2)=( 3 /16,5/16)
15i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o no fde Πa/dxa1 =de Πa/dxa2 =0 , and that the second-order conditions
for local maximum are satisﬁed.
Likewise, (xc1,x c2)=( 8 /16,16/16) is shown to be the unique solution of de Πc/dxc1 =
de Πc/dxc2 =0 , and that the second-order conditions for local maximum are satisﬁed. We
can also verify that dropping one of the two outlets decreases the proﬁto fﬁrm c.
Hence, (xa1,x a2,x c1,x b1,x b2,x c2)=( 3 /16,5/16,8/16,11/16,13/16,16/16) is the unique
partial segmentation conﬁguration that is an SPNE up to permutation. The equilibrium
prices and proﬁts given in Proposition 1 are also shown.
A.3 Segmentation
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the location competition can be easily shown. We show that
(xa1,x a2)=( 1 /6,1/6+r) is the maximizer of e Πa for all −1/6+r ≤ xa1 ≤ xa2 ≤ 3/6
given (xb1,x b1,x c2,x c2)=( 3 /6,3/6+r,5/6,5/6+r).
Computing de Πa/dxa1 +d e Πa/dxa2 =0 , we have an expression similar to (1). By
identifying the derivatives up to the 4th order, we can similarly show that (xa1,x a2)=
(1/6,4/6) is the unique solution of de Πa/dxa1 =d e Πa/dxa2 =0 , and that the second-
order conditions for local maximum are satisﬁed. Hence, (xa1,x a2,x b1,x b2,x c1,x c2)=
(1/6,1/6+r,3/6,3/6+r,5/6,5/6+r) is the unique segmentation conﬁguration that is
an SPNE up to permutation. The equilibrium prices and proﬁt sg i v e ni nP r o p o s i t i o n1
are similarly shown.
A.4 quasi-interlacing
Calculating the ﬁrst-order conditions of location equilibrium for arrangement a1b1c1a2c2b2
by the damped Newton’s method in Mathematica, we get (xa1,x b1,x c1,x b2,x a2,x c2)=
(r4,r 5,1/2,1/2+r4,1/2+r5,1). However, this is not a Nash equilibrium because the
proﬁto fﬁrm b increases upon withdrawing its ﬁrst outlet.
A.5 quasi-partial segmentation
Calculating the ﬁrst-order conditions of location equilibrium for arrangement a1a2b1c1b2c2
by the damped Newton’s method command in Mathematica, we have (xa1,x b1,x c1,x c2,x a2,x b2)=
16(r1,r 2,r 3,1 − r3,1 − r2,1 − r1). However, this is not a Nash equilibrium because the proﬁt
of ﬁrm c increases upon relocating its ﬁrst outlet from xc1 = r3 to xc1 =0 .
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Figure 3:   Convenience stores near Shinjuku station (blue: Seven-Eleven, red: Lawson,
                  green: FamilyMart, yellow: am/pm, light blue: CircleKSunkus)